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Social norms and farm animal protection
Nicolas Delon1
ABSTRACT
Social change is slow and difﬁcult. Social change for animals is formidably slow
and difﬁcult. Advocates and scholars alike have long tried to change attitudes
and convince the public that eating animals is wrong. The topic of norms and
social change for animals has been neglected, which explains in part the relative
failure of the animal protection movement to secure robust support reﬂected in
social and legal norms. Moreover, animal ethics has suffered from a dis-
proportionate focus on individual attitudes and behavior at the expense of col-
lective behavior, social change, and empirical psychology. If what we want to
change is behavior on a large scale, norms are important tools. This article
reviews an account of social norms that provides insights into the possibility and
limitations of social change for animals, approaching animal protection as a
problem of reverse social engineering. It highlights avenues for future work from
this neglected perspective.
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Introduction
Social change is slow and difﬁcult. Social change for animalsis formidably slow and difﬁcult, arguably slower than theincreasing global trends in meat consumption and intensi-
ﬁcation of farming practices.1 Animal advocates and scholars
alike have long tried to change attitudes and convince the public
that eating animals is wrong. This article sets aside this question,2
taking up instead the question of how to foster change given the
reasonably uncontroversial assumption that we have strong rea-
sons, moral and otherwise, not to cause unnecessary animal
suffering and other nefarious (environmental, public health3, and
social) consequences of factory farming. Sentient animals, who
are capable of pleasant and unpleasant experiences, deserve at
least some moral consideration that is incompatible with the
treatment to which most currently farmed animals are subjected.
Readers should note that they can adjust the assumption to
whatever baseline of decency they believe is required. Plausibly,
some social change is required anyway. If readers believe no
change is required, then they may be among the targets of this
article. This exploratory article seeks to clarify the problem of
animal welfare under a new light.
Why focus on norms? First, it is a neglected topic in the lit-
erature on animal rights and animal welfare. This explains in part
the relative failure of the animal protection movement to secure
robust support reﬂected in social and legal norms. A related
reason is that animal ethics has hitherto suffered from a dis-
proportionate focus on individual attitudes and behavior at the
expense of social change and empirical psychology. Recently,
however, philosophers have come to terms with this failure and
begun to approach animal welfare as a collective action problem
(Budolfson, 2015a; Nefsky, 2018) as well as one of psychology
(Caviola et al., 2018; Kasperbauer, 2018). This recent literature
motivates the present hypothesis, that unless we address animal
welfare as a problem of social change, changing individual atti-
tudes toward animals has little chance of effectively helping
animals. The harms caused by factory farming, and animal
agriculture more generally, are, like many environmental issues, a
large coordination problem. Hundreds of thousands may have
changed their views and diet after reading Peter Singer’s Animal
Liberation, taking an Animal Ethics class, reading a go veg! leaﬂet
or watching a gruesome video. What impact their individual
changes had on animal suffering is a distinct question (hint: lit-
tle). Attitudinal change in a context of deeply entrenched
anthropocentrism has rather low tractability. Moreover, indivi-
dual consumers in large-scale collective action problems are lar-
gely inefﬁcacious because everyone has at best a minuscule
probability of affecting the outcome. Here is another way to
capture the problem: even if it’s wrong to cause unnecessary
suffering to animals and animal agriculture is causing them dis-
proportionate amounts of unnecessary suffering, it does not
necessarily follow that it’s wrong (for you) to eat animals.
The question is thus not how we can change attitudes but how
norms affect behavior and how they can be altered. If behavior is
to be changed on a large scale, norms are important tools. But we
need to look at other cases of shifts in social norms—e.g.,
smoking, same-sex marriage, among others—to illustrate their
power, the mechanisms that best explain them, and ask if we can
expect similar mechanisms at play in the animal case. Such
detailed exploration is beyond the scope of this comment. Its goal
is to describe the problem and suggest future directions for work
on the tools of social change for animals. The problem is one of
reverse social engineering. We look at how norms have produced
change in the past and how the norms themselves were produced.
This is a stepping stone into such engineering.
Section 1 describes the current treatment of most domestic
animals in the U.S. as a problem of normalization. Section
2 speciﬁes what is meant by social norms, and how recent
accounts of social norms shed light on the mechanisms of social
change. Section 3 highlights the relevance of these theoretical
insights to animal welfare and hints at potential obstacles.
The normalization of customary practices
Only a tiny fraction of the animals with whom we interact are not
raised for food. Writing in 2004, David Wolfson and Marian
Sullivan note that, as of 2001, approximately 9.5 billion animals
were slaughtered annually in food production in the United
States, compared to 218 million killed by hunters and trappers
and in animal shelters, biomedical research, product testing,
dissection, and fur farms, combined. “From a statistician’s point
of view, since farmed animals represent 98 percent of all animals
(even including companion animals and animals in zoos and
circuses) with whom humans interact in the United States, all
animals are farmed animals; the number that are not is statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant.” (Wolfson and Sullivan, 2004, p. 206).
This means that 98% of the animals Americans interact with
have nearly no legal protection.4 The federal Animal Welfare Act,
which sets basic standards for the care of animals, simply exempts
farmed animals. No other federal law applies to raising animals.
Besides the 28-hour transport law, the Humane Slaughter Act is
the main piece of federal legislation protecting farmed animals
and requires that livestock slaughter “be carried out only by
humane methods” to prevent “needless suffering.” But regulations
promulgated pursuant to the statute exempt poultry. That is, over
95 percent of all farmed animals (approximately 8.5 billion
slaughtered per year) have no federal legal protection from
inhumane slaughter. And for those covered, no ﬁnes are applic-
able for violation of the statute and signiﬁcant penalties are never
imposed. (Wolfson and Sullivan, 2004, p. 207–208)
Are state legislations more adequate? State anticruelty statutes
are criminal statutes covering all animals. For this reason, they are
worded “in very broad and largely undeﬁned terms, and do not
speciﬁcally require afﬁrmative acts, such as adequate exercise,
space, light, ventilation, and clean living conditions.” (p. 209) The
farming industry is not like other industries, typically governed
by regulatory schemes promulgated and enforced by agencies.
Anticruelty statutes do not provide for speciﬁc welfare regula-
tions, regulatory enforcement of welfare standards, inspections, or
responsibility to any state or federal administrative agency. Their
enforcement, like other criminal statutes, is left primarily to the
police and prosecutors, for whom farming practices usually don’t
have priority. Yet, even though it faces nearly zero risk of pro-
secution, the industry has challenged these statutes. Since the
1990s, the majority of states with such statutes have persuaded
state legislatures to amend them to exempt all (or in rare cases
some) “accepted,” “common,” “customary,” or “normal” farming
practices. There is no statutory deﬁnition of customary practices,
but they include such things as intensive conﬁnement (gestation
and farrowing crates, veal crates, battery cages), non-anesthetized
debeaking, dehorning, and castration, and repeated impregnation.
As a result, whatever the industry does determines what is
accepted, hence exempted. Customary farming practices are
beyond the reach of U.S. courts even while they would be con-
sidered cruel, for instance, by current European standards.
To understand the impact of these legal exemptions, it is worth
delving into the concept of normality. Folk conceptions can
illuminate an important connection between social norms and
normality. Social norms both generate and rely on beliefs that a
behavior is normal. Adam Bear and Joshua Knobe conducted a
series of experiments examining the folk understanding of nor-
mality. They found that people tend to combine a sense of what is
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typical with a sense of what is ideal (Bear and Knobe, 2017a).
Normal is a statistical-evaluative complex. One of their examples
is, “What is the normal / average / ideal number of hours of TV
for a person to watch in a day?” Participants answered differently
for each version: “normal” (about 3 h), “average” (about 4), and
“ideal” (about 2.5). This suggests that judgments of normality
deviate from the average toward an evaluative standard. Other
examples follow this pattern: the normal grandmother, the nor-
mal salad, the normal number of students to be bullied in a
middle school. These ﬁndings illustrate an intriguing feature of
our minds—that in our ordinary thinking, we often cannot
separate the average from the ideal, the descriptive from the
prescriptive. Moral norms (or the ideal) impact the acquisition of
normality; conversely, normality (perceived social norms)
impacts the acquisition of moral norms.
“The consequences can be serious,” Bear and Knobe (2017b)
note. For example, as “President Trump continues to do things
that once would have been regarded as outlandish, these actions
are not simply coming to be regarded as more typical; they are
coming to be seen as more normal. As a result, they will come to
be seen as less bad and hence less worthy of outrage.” These
ﬁndings help to shed light on the “normalization” of customary
farming practices. The ﬂipside is that this should be true of “any
other controversial institution or practice that becomes more
widespread”, including same-sex marriage or gender reassign-
ment surgery. Also, despite this ingrained tendency, we are
“capable of distinguishing carefully between what is typical and
what is good.” Nonetheless, this tendency can override indivi-
duals’ reasoning capacities, and judgments of normality are
central to various aspects of cognition. The “normalization trap”
can therefore be a genuine source of concern as well as positive
change (altering perceptions of acceptability—the salience of the
ideal—can shift the average by decreasing the likelihood of
conformity).
There is evidence of the power of normalization in the case of
meat-eating behavior. Jared Piazza et al. (2015) drew on psy-
chologist Melanie Joy’s “Three Ns” theory of “carnism”—i.e., that
beliefs that eating meat is necessary, natural, and normal are the
main justiﬁcations that people give for eating animals (Joy, 2009).
Piazza and colleagues recruited omnivores in the U.S. and asked
them “Why is it OK to eat meat?” After categorizing their
responses, they found that people actually offered Joy’s three Ns
but also frequently a fourth N—eating meat is nice (i.e., plea-
surable, tasty, etc.).5 In studies 3–5, authors also showed that
individuals who endorsed the 4Ns tend not to be motivated by
ethical concerns when making food choices, are less proud of
their animal-product decisions, consume meat and animal pro-
ducts more frequently, and are highly committed to it. The 4Ns
can have a strong self-serving, rationalizing power for omnivores.
While normality appears to be just a subset of the main justiﬁ-
cations for eating meat, social norms are tied to all four justiﬁ-
cations, in the sense that they involve both empirical and
normative expectations (about what others do and what they
consider acceptable). Indeed, necessary, natural, normal, and nice
all carry a blend of descriptive and prescriptive elements.
With customary practices and a new account of normality in
the background, let us now brieﬂy introduce an account of social
norms. Inherent in the account are the causes and consequences
of social norms, hence of norm change.
What are social norms?
Norms come in various types and shapes. There are norms of
etiquette, conventions, rules of games, political norms, and reli-
gious, social, and moral norms. There are descriptive and pre-
scriptive norms. While the former capture actual patterns of
behavior, the latter are meant to guide behavior. Of course,
successful prescriptive norms are also descriptive: they generate
general compliance, which in turns reinforces them.
There are also various theories of norms. For present purposes,
norms are understood as patterns of behavior and attitudes. They
do not merely reﬂect behavioral regularities but also involve
characteristic attitudes that partly explain their presence (i.e.,
emergence, stabilization, and reinforcement). Such attitudes may
contribute to justifying norms, but they may as well reﬂect per-
ceived justiﬁcations of the norms. The relation between expla-
nation and justiﬁcation is further complicated by the existence of
different types of norms. Reasons accepted in the legal domain
may be questioned morally; legal reasons may also fail to reﬂect
socially endorsed reasons. So, we can conceive of norms as
complexes of behavior and attitudes, and as having effects on
behavior, rather than constituted by behavioral patterns, follow-
ing philosopher Philip Pettit (2002) and a number of legal
scholars and social scientists (e.g., Bicchieri, 2017; McAdams,
2000a, b, 2015; Sunstein, 1996). For instance, Pettit’s attitude-
based theory “starts with an explanation of why the behavior
attracts approval and then invokes the existence of that pattern to
explain the appearance of a regularity in that behavior.” (Pettit,
2002, p. 280) Since reputation is a good, it can reward (punish)
perceived good (bad) behavior. Both agents and their judges can
enact such reputational ﬂows unintentionally. This helps to
explain the spontaneous emergence and stabilization of norms in
societies. On Pettit’s account, a regularity counts as a norm when
(i) it is generally displayed, (ii) those subject to the norm generally
approve (disapprove) of others’ conforming (deviating), and (iii)
the pattern of approval and disapproval is part of the explanation
of the general conformity with the regularity (Pettit, 2002, p. 279).
Decades of social science have demonstrated that personal
attitudes are at best very weakly predictive of behavior. Research
shows that “the main variable affecting behavior is not what one
personally likes or thinks he should do, but rather one’s beliefs
about what ‘society’ (i.e., most other people, people who matter to
us, and the life) approves of” (Bicchieri, 2017, p. 10). In Bicchieri’s
account of social norms, the key mental states are the beliefs and
conditional preferences of social actors. Normative social expec-
tations express beliefs about other people’s beliefs about the social
acceptability of certain behaviors (p. 12). The importance of social
expectations underlines that of reference networks, “the range of
people whom we care about when making particular decisions”,
“against which expectations are set” (p. 14). This could include
friends and family, a village, a religious group, people in one’s
home country, and so forth. Social norms will change within the
reference network.
Bicchieri further distinguishes descriptive and social norms.
Descriptive norms are patterns of behavior such that individuals
prefer to conform to them on condition that they believe that
most people in their reference network conform to them
(empirical expectation). (p. 19) Social norms are rules of behavior
such that individuals prefer to conform to them on condition that
they believe that (a) most people in their reference network
conform to them (empirical expectation), and (b) that most
people in their reference network believe they ought to conform
to them (normative expectation). (p. 35) Expectations affect
behavior because the preference for complying is conditional on
one’s social expectations. Social norms rely on empirical expec-
tations (about what others do), as well as normative expectations
(about what others believe one ought to do). Deviating from
conventions or customs is inherently costly (driving in the wrong
lane, breaking norms of grammar): they are such that it is better
to follow them. Social norms are not self-enforcing in this way:
sanctions and rewards like appreciation, trust, respect, social
identity, and the beneﬁts of coordination can elicit compliance.
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In the next section, let us examine how this account of social
norms can explain the persistence of our dietary practices, and
what room it leaves for social change for animals.
Social norms and animals
People’s dietary habits are reinforced by both descriptive and
prescriptive norms (following the “4Ns”). Not all dietary habits
are mere customs –patterns of behavior consisting of a self-
reproducing collection of similar actions, “such that individuals
(unconditionally) prefer to conform to it because it meets their
needs.” (Bicchieri 2017, p. 15) Customs can act as “drags on social
change” since, no matter what others do or believe, (perceived)
need provides sufﬁcient motivation. Even though eating meat on
a regular basis is not a need for most people, it is often perceived
as one (i.e., “necessary” in the 4Ns). But, as noted, dietary habits
also involve norms further entrenching meat-eating behavior
(Joy, 2009). We can capture the persistence of eating meat as a
social norm, sustained by empirical and normative expectations
also expressed by legal and market norms. It is more than a mere
custom because the perception of need is not sufﬁcient to sustain
the practice. Only in the context of other beliefs and values does
this perceived need acquires normative force. Together, these
normative features of omnivore practices constitute a drag on
social change for animals.
Furthermore, change is hindered by the phenomenon of
pluralistic ignorance, whereby people infer that others hold atti-
tudes consistent with their observed behavior. Belief in descriptive
norms leads to the (self-serving) belief that the observed behavior
is normative and the object of mutual approval, regardless of
actual attitudes (Bicchieri, 2017, p. 42–47; Prentice and Miller,
1996). For instance in BRIC countries, people may underestimate
the level of support among their co-citizens for animal welfare.
Anderson and Tyler (2018, p. 8) note that
many people may hold the same attitude while simulta-
neously believing everyone else holds a different attitude,
because no one talks about their privately held beliefs …
People tend to avoid talking about the welfare of farmed
animals, so many individuals may privately hold more pro-
animal beliefs than is apparent from their behavior. This
information is useful to advocates… There may be room to
increase public support for animal advocacy in [BRIC]
countries simply by making people aware that many others
also think animal welfare is important.
Pluralistic ignorance may also partly explain the so-called
“meat paradox”, i.e., that most people eat meat yet many of them
experience moral discomfort when they do (Bastian and Lough-
nan, 2016).
Dietary practices present an astute challenge because they are
tied to a variety of domains—taste, tradition, religion, and culture
—that involve emotions, rituals, commitments, and values that
eschew reasoning and can be central to identities. As Bicchieri
notes, “If the issue being discussed is emotionally loaded, as is
often the case when discussing core values and especially in cases
of moral dumbfounding … arguing about the issue may prompt
the listeners to stonewall the argument.” (2017, p. 159) This
suggests that deliberation about eating animals should be sensi-
tive to cultural speciﬁcities (see Bilz and Nadler, 2014).
Social norms do not operate in a vacuum. They are part of
complex webs of factual and normative beliefs. Empirical inves-
tigation could reveal that some moral commitments are more
central to people’s identities than various ideological, religious,
and cultural commitments. And information about the harms
caused by farming as well as deliberation about beliefs and values
could lead to revision. For instance, harm appears to be a key
anchor across most cultures. Relying on extensive anthropological
literature, Shaun Nichols (2004) argues that harm-norms have
been pervasive, albeit with different forms and content, across
nearly all human cultures. To the extent that some harm-norms
are central to societies, new norms framed in terms of harm have
a better chance of spreading and being internalized. Nichols
(chapters 6–7) also offers a fascinating account of the evolution of
such norms, including regarding cruelty to animals over the last
few centuries.
Harm is one basis of moral and social norms, but there are
others. According to Jonathan Haidt and colleagues, human
morality is determined by six moral foundations: care vs. harm,
fairness vs. cheating, loyalty vs. betrayal, sanctity vs. degradation,
authority vs. subversion, and liberty vs. oppression, identiﬁed
from decades of surveys and experiments (Haidt and Graham,
2007). Although these are universal foundations, some human
groups express some more than others. In American society,
Haidt and his colleagues have argued that political liberals
prioritize fairness and caring, while conservatives also place
importance on loyalty, purity and other values tied to dominance
hierarchies (Graham et al., 2009). Graham et al. (2011) found
evidence of this asymmetry in twelve different regions of the
world. Drawing on this research, Kasperbauer (2018, p. 153–158)
infers that harm to animals is not a priority concern for certain
social categories. He further suggests how to tactically motivate
support for reforms across political lines: “instead of framing
duties to animals in terms of harm (Animals must not be made to
suffer) or fairness (All sentient beings deserve equal treatment),
duties could be framed in terms of loyalty (Americans show
compassion toward animals). And within speciﬁc domains of
animal use, improved welfare standards could perhaps be framed
in terms of purity (e.g., Cruel treatment of livestock makes our
food unsafe to eat).” (p. 190)
So how does change happen? Bicchieri reviews several tools of
social change: law, media campaigns (including popular culture
and trendsetters), economic incentives, and deliberation, which
often perform the double function of changing perceptions of
certain practices and their expectations about whether other
people will still follow and/or endorse them. These tools have four
prerequisites. First, there must be shared reasons for the change.
A variety of factors can make such reasons emerge or crystallize—
technology, factual information, shifts in values or in social
expectations. While the power of ethics to effect change is limited,
one may hope that arguments in animal ethics can contribute to
those shared reasons, as has, famously, Peter Singer’s Animal
Liberation. Second, we must be conﬁdent that others would act
similarly, otherwise deviation might have negative consequences
(exclusion from social beneﬁts, bad reputation, ostracism…).
Third, coordination is often necessary. With descriptive norms,
this is easily achieved by communication within the reference
network, but sometimes it is “risky to be a ‘ﬁrst mover’” (Bic-
chieri, 2017, p. 109), unless one is a trendsetter. With meat, we are
vulnerable to a typical collective action problem. It’s individually
more convenient for most people not to make the shift on their
own, regardless of the expected beneﬁts of collective change. The
fourth prerequisite follows from the need for coordination: col-
lective change of expectations. For instance, with water con-
sumption, public reports that consumption is steadily
diminishing can help coordinate actions and expectations by
raising conﬁdence that one’s personal water-preserving efforts
will not be in vain. (p. 110)6
In sum, changing norms in large-scale collective action pro-
blems is itself a coordination problem. Information campaigns,
public declarations, and common pledges can help to motivate
and synchronize those tempted to deviate and establish new
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norms (Bicchieri and Mercier, 2014). For now, animal welfare
may not meet either of these prerequisites.
Future work should look in more detail at when these tools,
when the prerequisites were met, effectively produced change,
and if the same conditions can be met in the animal case. Case
studies include the abolitionist and civil rights movement, the
marriage equality movement, and the regulation of smoking, as
well as different tactics currently used by the animal rights
movement (courts, direct action, grassroots organizing, infor-
mation campaigns, and legislative lobbying).7 Besides, critical
attention should be paid to the use of regulatory cost-beneﬁt
analysis internalizing “moral commitments,” including
willingness-to-pay for animal welfare (see Posner and Sunstein,
2017; but see Kuenzler and Kysar, 2014), nudges and market-
based strategies, the role of shame (Jacquet, 2015; but see Nuss-
baum, 2004) and other potential enforcers of social norms like
trendsetters (e.g. vegan celebrities), judicial activism, and state
ballot initiatives (Bollard, 2017). Finally, it will be important to
separate cases based primarily on self-interest from those based
on other-regarding considerations.8 For, even though smoking
falls into the former category, its moralization owed a lot to the
perception that it could harm others (Bilz and Nadler, 2014). A
similar path might be promising for animal welfare. Of course,
social change is only a part of broader societal change including
political, economic and technological change. There is all reason
to expect that, say, increased bipartisan support and the rise of
synthetic animal products could set a new stage for a shift in
social norms, and vice versa. Yet consider same-sex marriage.
Three conditions of the success of the marriage equality move-
ment may, for now, be missing for animals: (i) the presence of
many LGBT people in many families across the political spec-
trum; (2) the existence of norm entrepreneurs in prominent
socio-economic positions, who may or often may not have dis-
closed their homosexuality; (3) the fact that marriage equality
didn’t require that people change their way of life.9 Farm animals
obviously fail the ﬁrst two conditions. Animal advocates, how-
ever, can ﬁll the spot. And technological change (e.g., cellular
agriculture) may at some point make it convenient for many
people to abstain from animal products without signiﬁcantly
altering their way of life (Shapiro, 2018).10 These changes can, in
turn, alter both normative and empirical expectations to foster
norm change.
This article has described the ways in which animal protection
can be fruitfully approached from the perspective of norms.
Eating meat is normal. This means that the problem cannot
simply be addressed as a problem of attitudinal change. If we can
reverse engineer both the current state of affairs regarding ani-
mals and relevantly similar examples of social change, then we
might uncover potent social tools.
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Notes
1 This is true in no small part due to upward trends in BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia,
India, China) (Anderson and Tyler, 2018). Importantly, though, welfare reforms
could garner signiﬁcant support in some BRIC countries (Ibid.). There is some
anecdotal evidence that vegetarianism and veganism have increased in some
developed countries like the U.K., but the evidence is not conclusive (the numbers
remain very low and steady in the U.S., for instance).
2 A 2015 Gallup poll (http://news.gallup.com/poll/183275/say-animals-rights-people.
aspx) found that 32% of Americans said they believe “animals deserve the exact same
rights as people to be free from harm and exploitation” (up from 25% in 2008), 62%
say they deserve some protection but can still be used for the beneﬁt of humans, yet
only 26% are “very concerned” about the current treatment of US farm animals. One
possible explanation is ignorance of standard practices. For example, 60% of
Americans thought that “the majority of pigs raised for pork in the United States
have access to the outdoors at least some portion of each day.” (Cummins et al.,
2015). In the meantime, while numbers have been up, only between 2 and 6% of
Americans self-identify as vegetarian or vegan, with many of them actually reporting
they not infrequently eat meat (https://animalcharityevaluators.org/blog/is-the-
percentage-of-vegetarians-and-vegans-in-the-u-s-increasing/).
3 This includes contribution to cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, and respiratory
illnesses in humans, and antibiotic resistance among farm animals.
4 Discussion in this section is restricted to the U.S. context. Where, like in the
European Union, animal welfare regulations are more stringent, the problem of farm
animal protection is still one of social norms.
5 The 4 N classiﬁcation captures the vast majority (83–91%) of offered justiﬁcations.
“Necessary” was the most widespread, but “Natural” and “Nice” were the most highly
endorsed.
6 For a new norm to emerge, normative expectations have to change ﬁrst, and
empirical expectations follow. To abandon a norm, it is the other way around.
(Bicchieri 2017, p. 111)
7 For skeptical takes on the power of courts to effect change, see, e.g., Bilz and Nadler
(2014) and Rosenberg (2008).
8 Contrary to animal advocacy, past social movements have involved members of
human society, or members of the workforce who have (strictly) economic or
productive value (Leiter, 2013). Negative attitudes or moral indifference toward
members of other species, combined with self-interest, constitute a major obstacle to
change which future work needs to grapple with (Caviola et al., 2018).
9 Thanks to Martha Nussbaum for these insights.
10 One may expect some resistance, based in particular on the “4Ns”, if people see
cultured meat as unnatural. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making this point.
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